University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

2012

Back to the Future
William D. Araiza

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Araiza, William D., "Back to the Future" (2012). Constitutional Commentary. 1151.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1151

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

!!!ARAIZA-281-BACKTOFUTURE.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

5/31/2012 12:50 PM

Book Reviews
BACK TO THE FUTURE
REHABILITATING
LOCHNER:
DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE
REFORM. By David Bernstein.1 Chicago, University of
Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 194. $45.00 (Cloth).
William D. Araiza
3

2

4

“If you think Roe is right, why do you think Lochner is
wrong?”
Constitutional law professors love playing this card with
students. We like to think it forces them to confront how their
policy preferences influence their legal analysis. And it is a nice
5
6
trick: Roe v. Wade responds to many (though not all ) students’
policy intuitions about the desirability of a broad abortion right,
7
while Lochner v. New York is often taught as the paradigmatic
anti-canonical case, a dark stain on the Supreme Court in the
8
9
tradition of Dred Scott v. Sanford and Plessy v. Ferguson (the
1. Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
2. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The reviewer wishes to acknowledge
the financial support provided by the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research
Stipend Program. Thanks also to Sara Bernstein and Kristie LaSalle for fine research
assistance.
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Wade, 410 U.S. at 115.
6. Some studies suggest that young people may be less committed to abortion
rights, or at least to the morality of abortion, than suggested by the standard story that
holds that younger groups are inevitably more liberal on social issues. See, e.g., ROBERT
P. JONES ET AL., COMMITTED TO AVAILABILITY, CONFLICTED ABOUT MORALITY:
WHAT THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION TELLS US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE
ABORTION DEBATE AND THE CULTURE WARS, 8–10 (2011) available at http://www.
publicreligion.org/research/?id=615 (polling data suggesting a “decoupling” of young
people’s attitudes toward same-sex marriage and abortion).
7. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
8. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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latter of which is sometimes paired with Lochner as the one-two
punch of the evil Gilded Age Court).
But not so fast. David Bernstein has done admirable work
in debunking the melodramatic aspects of Lochner, and of the
Lochner era more generally. His recent book, Rehabilitating
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive
Reform, while breaking little new analytical ground beyond his
10
recapitulates his
voluminous scholarship on the issue,
impressive revisionist scholarship about Lochner and its
eponymous era. His careful research makes clear that the
Lochner era was not one in which a hopelessly reactionary Court
in the service of the economic elite continually used woodenly
formalistic reasoning to stymie needed social reform. Instead, he
paints a much more balanced picture of the contending forces of
the period.
To begin with, Bernstein views the Court’s conservatives as
sincerely concerned with individual liberty, both in terms of results and philosophy. For example, consider Meyer v. Nebraska,
the 1923 case where the Court struck down a state law
11
prohibiting the teaching of German. Bernstein notes that Meyer
relied heavily on economic due process precedents, including
Lochner itself. Thus, to the extent that modern substantive due
12
process cases rely on Meyer, a fair case could be made that Roe
was in fact the spawn of Lochner. He also observes that Meyer
was authored by Justice McReynolds, whose notorious racism
and anti-Semitism makes him, at least among the cognoscenti,
probably the most unattractive villain of the pro-Lochner Four
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Retrospective];
David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005) [hereinafter Bernstein, Bolling]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Revisionism]; David E. Bernstein,
Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003); David E. Bernstein, Book Review:
Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1960 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Feminist]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
11. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion
case to Meyer).
12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (citing Meyer but concluding that “the more pertinent beginning point” for the Court’s substantive due process
analysis is Griswold); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Meyer but explaining it as a First
Amendment case).
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13

Horsemen. To gild the lily, one could add to Bernstein’s
analysis the observation that McReynolds’ prose from the
14
follow-on case to Meyer, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, especially
15
his rejection of the state’s authority to “standardize” children,
bears for contemporary liberals an uncomfortable resemblance
to Justice Brennan’s language in Michael H. v. Gerald D. about
the protection due process affords to the freedom “not to
16
conform.”
Contrast this picture of the conservative wing of the Court
with the picture Bernstein paints of their Progressive opponents,
on and off the Court. Rather than viewing them as heroic
defenders of the downtrodden, Bernstein sees them as statists
who would allow government a free hand to protect white, male,
unionized labor at the expense of less favored workers, outlaw
private (i.e., Catholic) education, and otherwise trample on
individual liberties in the service of broader social goals. Indeed,
Bernstein paints the Progressive cause in even darker terms: in
Progressives’ views, less-capable workers are deemed unworthy
of protection if minimum wage laws lead to their exclusion from
the job market (pp. 53–54), women are intentionally excluded
from that market (pp. 58, 62, 65, 66), and most menacingly,
mental “defectives” are susceptible to the state’s power to
sterilize them for the good of society (pp. 96–98). If Bernstein’s
description of the conservatives can be summed up by
McReynolds’s protection of parents’ liberty to avoid state
“standardization” of their children, his description of the
Progressives can be summed up by Holmes’ cruel aphorism in
17
Buck v. Bell: “Three generations of imbeciles is enough.”
13. He was also notoriously cruel to his law clerks. See, e.g., Barry Cushman,
Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 733–738 (2003); see also TODD PEPPERS,
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME
COURT LAW CLERK 66–68 (2006).
14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. Id. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”).
16. 491 U.S. 110, 136, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926). Indeed, the earlier parallel between
Justice McReynolds’ language in Meyer and Justice Brennan’s language in Michael H.,
see text accompanying supra notes 14–16, finds a mirror image in the comparison
between Justice Holmes and Justice Scalia: in Lochner, Holmes insisted that the Court
not strike down laws as violating substantive due process unless the statute “would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law,” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 55 (1905) (Holmes J, dissenting), language
that would fit comfortably in a due process opinion written by Justice Scalia, see, e.g.,
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But the standard Lochner story may be invalid for a second
reason as well, one that Bernstein does not accept. A second
question raised by Lochner is whether Roe necessarily follows
from it, or, by contrast, whether Roe and modern due process
cases can be understood as having a different parentage. Under
an alternative view to Bernstein’s, modern substantive due
process owes (or should owe) at least as much to equality con18
cerns as to liberty. If this view is accepted, then the LochnerRoe connection is broken, or at least mitigated. In that case,
maybe there is an answer to the law professor’s gotcha question.
Maybe you can agree with Roe but disagree with Lochner.
This Review follows, approximately, the structure of
Bernstein’s book. Part I reviews the story of Lochner v. New
York: its facts, the opinions and the question of its jurisprudential foundation. Part II considers Lochner’s implications,
both for what are now called “civil rights” or “civil liberties” and
for minorities. Part III considers the modern implications of the
absorption of many Lochner-based precedents into equal
19
protection or equal protection-like categories —in particular,
what that absorption means for Lochner’s status as the father
that modern substantive due process jurisprudence refuses to
20
acknowledge.
I. THE LOCHNER CASE
A. THE FACTS
Bernstein’s description of Lochner does much to dispel the
notion that the New York Bakeshop Law reflected a simple
story of oppressed workers seeking legislative aid against

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 586, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. See infra Part III.
19. By “equal protection-like” I mean in particular the content-neutrality rule in
free speech and the requirement of discrimination in free exercise claims. The former in
particular is noteworthy, as the content-neutrality rule derived from a case that was
decided as an equal protection case. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); see also Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Compensation Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124, 125 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting this
history, and tracing it to Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).
20. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (“We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice
Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–482 (1965) (“Overtones of some arguments suggest that
Lochner v. State of New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation . . .”
(citation omitted)).
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powerful capitalists. Bernstein argues that, as is sometimes the
case with regulatory legislation, the powerful sectors of the
relevant industry supported the law, with an eye to restricting
the competition posed by newer, smaller entrants into the
market. In this case, Bernstein argues that the large bakeries
supporting the law already satisfied its sanitary rules and
maximum working-hours provisions, and thus had little to fear
from it (p. 27). Conversely, Bernstein argues that the forces
opposed to the law were small bakeshops, in particular those
owned by recent Jewish, Italian and French immigrants (p. 24).
In setting up the conflict this way, Bernstein returns to a
theme that he has expressed before: that ostensibly pro-labor
regulatory legislation, such as laws permitting or even requiring
closed-shop arrangements, are often really attempts by
entrenched groups to secure benefits for themselves by limiting
21
the operation of the free market. Bernstein has made this point
when arguing that pro-union legislation harmed AfricanAmericans who were shut out of those unions because of racism,
and thus were shut out of economic opportunities when
legislation benefitted union members at the expense of nonunion workers. In Rehabilitating Lochner he suggests similar
effects, if not similar malicious motivation, with regard to laws
regulating the terms of work performed by women (pp. 58, 62,
22
65, 66). The heroic picture of Progressive legislatures protecting
oppressed workers from rapacious capitalists becomes instead an
anti-heroic one where powerful interests groups (now including
unions) band together to preserve their monopoly privileges
against the striving of less powerful underclass groups.
But problems lurk within this story, even as Bernstein tells
it. First, a single piece of legislation may have many different
effects, some nefarious and others quite benign. For example,
Bernstein cites bakery owners who supported the law in part

21. See DAVID BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE FOR REDRESS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
THE NEW DEAL 111–18 (2001) [hereinafter, BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE].
22. See also Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10, at 1971 (describing the view of
“some reformers” during the Lochner era that that “saw women workers as an obstacle
to their goal of persuading society that employers should be required to pay male heads
of households a wage sufficient to support their families” and writing that “[t]he National
Consumers’ League opposed . . . any . . . reform that might tempt women to enter the
workforce”); id. at 1985 (“[P]rotective [labor] legislation was often promoted by labor
unions that excluded women to prevent them from competing for jobs held or sought by
union members”).
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because they hoped its sanitary provisions would improve the
reputation of bakeries, thus leading consumers to patronize
them rather than baking their own bread (p. 27). Presumably,
government has a legitimate interest in increasing the public’s
confidence in an industry-based food distribution network, apart
from either any discriminatory effects the law might have or any
restrictions on liberty of contract it might impose. Concededly,
this justification does not mitigate the law’s impact on equality
or liberty rights. But it does blur the previously-clear picture of
the bakeshop law as purely special interest legislation, unless
legislative encouragement of industrial growth is itself special
23
interest legislation.
Second, the underlying facts justifying legislation are often
hard to discern conclusively. Bernstein’s own research reveals
this. He notes that, in the run-up to the bakeshop law, New York
had been roiled by accounts of unsanitary conditions in bakeshops. In particular, he recounts the story of a “dying Jewish
baker . . . carried from a cellar bakery on the Lower East Side”
in 1894 (p. 25). Based on that event, the bakery union chief
convinced a newspaper to run a series of muckraking articles
investigating and exposing conditions in bakeshops. But
Bernstein expresses some doubt about the accuracy of the
reporting, based on the reporter’s sympathies and the timing of
the article. He also cites two government reports that came to
contradictory conclusions about the veracity of the reporter’s
conclusions (p. 25).
How is a legislature to know which facts most closely
approximate reality? More relevantly, how is a court to know?
The difficulty courts have in discerning both legislative
motivations and underlying policy facts has led, in the modern
23. If such motivations are illegitimate, then presumably broad swaths of the
common law designed to further entrepreneurship and risk-taking would be similarly
problematic. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11-56 (“The decision [in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.) 151 (1854) (limiting damages available for breach of
contract to those that are foreseeable or avoidable)] was clearly based on the policy of
protecting enterprises in the then-burgeoning industrial revolution); Joseph M. Perillo,
Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1096 (2000) (writing, in the context of a discussion of Hadley,
that “the rule of certainty, like the rule of foreseeability, encourages entrepreneurial risk
taking”); Jan Gordon Laitos, Continuities From the Past Affecting Resource Use and
Conservation Patterns, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 60, 83 (1975) (“The central concept of tort
liability [in the nineteenth century] reflected society’s favor for production . . . By
reducing legal risks through the liability concept, tort law tended to encourage
entrepreneurs to venture for productive ends.”).
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era, to the extreme deference courts exhibit when considering
claims of infringements of non-fundamental rights and
discrimination against non-suspect classes. Of course, Bernstein
is an academic, not a legislator or a judge; based on his historical
investigation he might be able to draw more confident
conclusions about these issues. But even he is forced to
introduce some ambiguity into his narrative. For example, as
noted above he cites two different government studies that
reached different conclusions about the health risks of
bakeshops.
It is probably the case that both public health and antinewcomer sentiment motivated the New York legislature, just as
it is probably the case that the law both advanced public health
and disparately impacted newcomers. How great were those
effects and what was the legislature’s predominant motivation
24
(even assuming legislative motivation is relevant)? The
difficulty in answering those questions makes judicial review—
like that in Lochner—difficult. In turn, this difficulty counsels in
favor of either narrowing the set of situations where courts will
perform careful review, or abandoning the careful review
Lochner exhibited in favor of more deferential judicial scrutiny.
But Lochner, by insisting on at least some degree of real judicial
review every time a regulation impaired one’s ability to act in

24. Bernstein argues that the Court during this period did not inquire into
underlying legislative purpose (p. 15). While there is language in the caselaw supporting
this conclusion, commentators have sometimes described opinions during this period as
turning on considerations of congressional motive. See, e.g., Rosiland Dixon, Partial
Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 663 (2011) (suggesting that the
Court considered congressional motive in the child labor cases, Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), where the
Court rejected, respectively, federal bans on interstate shipment and taxation of child
labor-manufactured goods as illegitimate attempts by Congress to regulate manufacturing). Ultimately, the distinction here may turn on whether the term “motive”
implies some level of subjective motivation or a “purpose” abstracted out from the
necessary effect of the law at issue. See, e.g., Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38 (“Although Congress
[in the ostensible tax it levied on child labor-manufactured items] does not invalidate the
contract of employment or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned
ages is illegal, it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting
the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who
transgress its standard.”); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It is
impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while
passed under what is claimed to be the police power . . . are, in reality, passed from other
motives. We are justified in saying so when, from the character of the law and the subject
upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare bears but the most
remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural
and legal effect of the language employed . . . .”).
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the marketplace, opened up the specter of judicial review of
every instance of what we now call “economic and social
25
regulation.”
B. A LACK OF DEFERENCE?
Lochner’s insistence on more than pro forma judicial review
in every case of contractual liberty requires an examination of
the deference with which the Court acted. Justice Peckham’s
opinion for the Court has been roundly criticized for its failure
to defer to the legislature’s determinations. Such deference
could take one of two, or possibly three, forms. First, it could
take the form of Justice Holmes’s presumption that such
legislation was constitutional, given his understanding that the
Due Process Clause simply did not protect substantive rights
such as the right to contract. In a sense, the Holmes approach is
not deference at all, as it reflects a bright-line rule that the
Constitution simply does not speak to the claim at issue.
A second approach, one that is deferential in the true sense
of the word, is reflected by the modern rational basis standard
used to decide cases where non-fundamental rights are alleged
to be unconstitutionally infringed. This approach, while similarly
yielding predictable government wins, at least leaves open the
theoretical possibility that a law could be so arbitrary that it
violates the substantive guarantee of liberty found in the Due
Process Clause. Finally, a third approach, the one associated
with Justice Harlan’s Lochner dissent, defers to government
determinations that the public interest requires an infringement
on liberty, but does so only after something more than
perfunctory judicial review.
Did Justice Peckham really refuse to defer? His opinion for
the Court reads at times like a breezy rejection of the
legislature’s findings: he relied on “the common understanding”
that “the trade of a baker has never been understood as an
26
unhealthy one,” and then complained that upholding the New
York law would render susceptible to state regulation every
profession, since, “unfortunately . . . labor, even in any department [sic], may possibly carry with it the seeds of
27
unhealthiness.” On the other hand, he also wrote that he
25. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (using this term).
26. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
27. Id.
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reached his conclusion about the health risk of being a baker “in
28
looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations.”
Indeed, Bernstein elsewhere argues that Peckham “clearly relied
on—but, to the detriment of his reputation, did not explicitly
cite—the studies discussed in the appendix to Lochner’s brief
showing bakers had similar mortality rates to many ordinary
29
professions that the legislature did not regulate.” But even had
Peckham explicitly cited those studies he still would have been
susceptible to the criticism that he was choosing for himself
which studies to rely on and which to discredit. By contrast,
Harlan explicitly cited studies that supported the view that
30
baking was unhealthful work. Based on that evidence, he
concluded that the law was not “beyond all question a plain,
31
palpable invasion of rights secured by” the Constitution. The
charge of failure to defer appears solid.
More generally, Bernstein’s careful analysis of the differing
deference levels in the various Lochner opinions helpfully
illuminates two distinct disagreements on the Court. One,
between Holmes and the eight Justices comprising the Peckham
majority and the Harlan dissent, centered on the existence of an
unenumerated right to contract, and, indeed, on whether the
Due Process Clause protected any substantive rights whatsoever.
The other faultline exposed by Lochner concerned the amount
of deference legislatures were due when they regulated in ways
that impaired contractual liberty. Both of these divisions were
moving targets: by 1925, Justice Holmes was willing to recognize,
based on the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause in
other contexts, that the Clause provided at least some protection
32
for the freedom of speech. Similarly, Bernstein notes that in the
second decade of the twentieth century the Court became
significantly friendlier to government regulation, but then

28. Id.
29. See Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1498.
30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Bernstein elsewhere notes
that the studies Harlan cited did not appear in New York’s brief. Bernstein,
Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1499.
31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The
general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as
there used. . . .”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (recognizing, based on precedent, that the Due Process Clause provided
substantive guarantees that included the First Amendment right to freedom of speech).
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increased its scrutiny again with the ascension of several Harding
appointees (pp. 48–49).
Here again Bernstein performs a useful service by performing a more fine-grained analysis of the Lochner Court. In
particular, by considering Harlan’s dissent he does much to
dispel the black-and-white narrative that too often passes as the
truth about Lochner. However, his carefulness in delineating the
different phases of the Lochner era has the ironic effect of
watering down the force of his argument about the Court’s mode
of analysis during this period, and the implications of its
approach. Simply put, it is harder to paint a coherent picture of
how much the Court deferred to legislative judgments (and thus
how strictly it protected the right to contract), and how its
approach impacted minorities and other outsiders, given the
Court’s evolution from its early-phase stringent review to its
33
middle-phase (relatively) lenient review, and then back again.
Obviously, it’s not Bernstein’s fault that the Court didn’t
apply a consistent analytical approach during this period, even if
that ambiguity does muddy his underlying narrative. More
importantly for our purposes, the question of how much the
Lochner-era Court really deferred to marketplace regulation
becomes less important once the economic regulation cases
provided the foundation for the Court’s non-economic liberty
jurisprudence. To the extent the marketplace cases generated
Meyer and its progeny, the impact of that generative process
persisted, even if the stringency of the Court’s underlying
economic due process analysis waxed and waned.
C. LIBERTY OR EQUALITY?
In Rehabilitating Lochner, Bernstein makes a powerful
argument that Lochner was based on liberty rather than equality
concerns. To many ears this may sound obvious. However,
Bernstein rightly chooses to spend time addressing the argument, most fully developed by Michael Les Benedict and
Howard Gillman, that Lochner-era jurisprudence focused less on
protecting individual liberty than on ensuring that government
34
not enact so-called “class legislation.” Anxiety about class

33. Indeed, Bernstein speculates that Lochner itself included statements that not all
members of the five-Justice majority agreed with (pp. 34–35). Thus, even the case itself
arguably stands for less than what it appears to at face value.
34. See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
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legislation—that is, legislation that bestowed benefits and
burdens unequally, and in particular legislation that granted
monopoly privileges—was surely a major concern of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Bernstein acknowledges that avoidance of class legislation was a major concern of the original
35
framers (who expressed it as a concern about faction), antebellum constitutional thinkers and the framers of the Fourteenth
36
Amendment (pp. 14–15). But in his other writing, Bernstein
argues that the class legislation prohibition was never inter37
preted stringently by the Supreme Court. Indeed, he contrasts
the Supreme Court with some state high courts, which he argues
38
enforced equality guarantees strictly.
It is difficult in a short review to evaluate which side has the
better of the debate, in large part because, as Bernstein himself
notes, class legislation restrictions constituted part of the Court’s
understanding of due process. This should not be surprising: our
current practice of rigidly separating substantive rights, protected under due process, from equality rights, protected under
equal protection, was likely alien to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s drafters, or at least not their primary under39
standing. For confirmation, one need only look to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which protected not a particular level of
contract and property rights, but the same level of protection as
40
that a state granted white citizens.
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to resolve this dispute.
Regardless of Lochner’s basis, the fact remains that the Meyer
line of cases began to diverge from any explicit concern with
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293
(1985); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
35. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 34, at 22 (“[t]he distinctions Lochner era judges
attempted to draw between valid public-purpose legislation . . . and invalid class
legislation . . . had their origins in a similar set of distinctions elaborated by the framers of
the Constitution”).
36. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination:
One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1373–
74 (1990); see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and
Colorblindedness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 251–68 (1997).
37. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 15–21; Bernstein, Feminist, supra
note 10, at 1963.
38. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 18–20.
39. A vestige of this understanding may remain today in the fundamental rights
strand of equal protection. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 237 (1965) (concluding that the
Equal Protection Clause required full—that is, substantive—protection for these rights).
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class legislation or equality. Certainly these cases can be
understood as dealing with unequal or discriminatory legislation.
Indeed, that fact may allow their legitimate reconceptualization
41
as cases about discrimination. But language about class
legislation is largely absent from the actual opinions. Thus, one
can remain agnostic about the liberty vs. class legislation debate
in Lochner while still recognizing that, somehow, Lochner’s
progeny became based on substantive liberty rather than on the
requirement that all legislation be general.
II. LOCHNER’S IMPLICATIONS
The middle chapters of Rehabilitating Lochner—Chapters 4
and 5, and to a great degree Chapter 6—consider Lochner’s
implications for, respectively, sex equality, racial equality, and
what we now call “civil rights” or “civil liberties.” Bernstein
makes important claims in these chapters, which are all the more
significant because they challenge the standard view that
Lochner-era jurisprudence inevitably favored powerful interests
at the expense of the powerless. These claims deserve a closer
look.
A. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND LOCHNER
What did Lochner mean for the rights we today call “civil
rights” or “civil liberties?” Bernstein is persuasive in arguing
that Lochner was the doctrinal font for the Court’s gradual
embrace of such rights in the 1920’s and 1930’s. He notes that
42
Justice McReynolds’s opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska relied
heavily on economic due process cases as support for the
proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a parent’s right
43
to direct his child’s upbringing. More generally, Lochner-era
Justices favoring the right to contract also played important roles
in expanding civil liberties. For example, Justice McReynolds, in
41. See infra Part II(A).
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion
case to Meyer).
43. Later opinions upholding constitutional rights claims did not rely as heavily on
economic due process as the foundation. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-67
(1932) (relying on history and general statements in early cases about the possibility that
“due process” included specific Bill of Rights guarantees to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming, without deciding
or giving extended discussion, that due process liberty included the freedom of speech).
But see 268 U.S. at 666 n.9 (citing, among other cases, the statement in Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), that liberty and property are “human rights”).
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writing Meyer, used expansive language about the scope of
44
individual liberty, while Justice Sutherland wrote important
45
civil liberties opinions in the criminal procedure and press
46
freedom areas. Conversely, Justices Holmes and Brandeis were,
at best, reluctant converts to the cause of substantive due
47
process liberty.
So it seems like an open and shut case that Lochner is the
font of the Court’s first protections of civil liberties, and thus of
the Court’s modern individual rights jurisprudence. But the
picture is at least slightly more complicated. As Bernstein
himself has noted in his previous scholarship on the Lochner era,
many of those early civil rights cases dealt with government
action that had severe disparate impacts on minorities. The
statute struck down in Meyer was the product of anti-German
48
xenophobia during the World War I era, while the law at issue
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters clearly aimed at Catholic
49
education, the hangover from the bitter nineteenth century
disputes between Protestants seeking to inculcate their religious
values via public education and Catholics seeking to preserve
44. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“While this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
45. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell was the case dealing with
“the Scottsboro Boys,” African-American young men who were victimized by a racist
criminal justice system in the South.
46. See Am. Press v. Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); ARTHUR HELLMAN, WILLIAM
ARAIZA AND THOMAS BAKER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
RELIGION 820 (2nd ed. 2010) (noting Sutherland’s position).
47. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”); Gitlow, 258 U.S. at 671 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the
word ‘liberty’ as there used”); see also p. 101 (describing Holmes’ recognition that due
process protects the freedom of speech as “grudging”).
48. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1273 (“The Meyer law had been
motivated by nativist hysteria attendant to World War I.”).
49. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1274 (describing the law struck down in
Pierce as “inspired by anti-Catholic sentiment”). For an alternative view, see Steven J.
Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy,
12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 105–09 (2010) (arguing that the Oregon referendum leading to
the law struck down in Pierce was not heavily motivated by anti-Catholic animus).
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50

their values via parochial education. The major speech cases of
the era all dealt (as they usually do) with the speech of
51
dissenters, usually unpopular ones at that. For their part the
criminal procedure cases dealt with criminal defendants, hardly
the most popular group in any polity. This fact was especially
true during this era, as the key cases that began using the Due
Process Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights’ criminal
procedure provisions dealt with racist southern criminal justice
52
systems and African-American defendants.
Indeed, as Bernstein briefly notes (p. 104), the Court in the
53
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
54
transformed Meyer, Pierce and similar cases into cases that
stood for the proposition that “similar considerations [requiring
more stringent judicial review than normal] enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial
55
minorities.” Bernstein is more than grudging here: referring to
footnote four’s treatment of the Meyer line of cases, he writes as
follows: “The Court creatively reinterpreted—that is, intentionally misinterpreted—Meyer and Pierce as decisions
invalidating laws because the laws discriminated against
minorities” (p. 104).

50. See, e.g., Meir Katz, The Economics of Section 170: A Case for the Charitable
Deduction of Parochial School Tuition, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 224, 259 n.134
(2011) (noting this phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries);
Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the Old-Anti-Catholicism 4–7, 10–11 (Wayne
State University Law School Working Paper No. 10-13), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1943646 (same); see also id. at n.1 (citing sources); Bernstein, Bolling,
supra note 10, at 1274 (discussing Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), a case
dealing with a Hawaii law restricting foreign-language education, which Bernstein
describes as “designed to shut down Japanese-language schools in Hawaii”).
51. E.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 252 (considering a free speech challenge to a New York
law aimed at agitation in favor of the overthrow of private property); Herndon v.
Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (finding First Amendment protection for Communist
literature calling for a separate state for African Americans living in the South).
52. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (“Scottsboro Boys” case). Note,
however, that pro-Lochner Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented in Powell, albeit
on a narrow ground. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 492 n.18 (2009) (citing cases); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 764 (1991) (“The vast
majority of the Court’s first constitutional interventions in state criminal procedure
involved the Jim Crow ‘justice’ southern states meted out to black defendants.”).
53. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
54. See id. (citing Meyer, Pierce, and also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), the
companion case to Meyer, and Farrington, which dealt with a similar restriction on
foreign-language schools in the very different context of Hawaii, where the Court, relying
on Meyer, Pierce and Bartels, struck down the law).
55. Id.
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The stridency of Bernstein’s criticism seems a little unfair.
Bernstein does not develop the argument in Rehabilitating
Lochner, but in other scholarship he has argued that the Meyer
line of cases and others (most notably Adkins v. Children’s
56
57
Hospital and Buchanan v. Warley ) are based on an approach
in which, once a court identifies a protected liberty interest that
the law infringes, discriminatory motives or goals are insufficient
58
to provide a police power justification for the infringement.
Thus, his argument with regard to footnote four’s treatment of
Meyer seems to be that footnote four focused on the fact of
discrimination, rather than on the insufficiency of discriminatory
motives as justification for an infringement on liberty rights.
In theory this is a real distinction. Under Bernstein’s
understanding of how the Lochner-era Court analyzed cases like
Meyer, a crucial first step was the identification of a liberty right.
If no liberty right was at stake, that was the end of the case—the
government won. But if such a liberty right did exist, the
government could not justify its infringement by claiming a
59
discriminatory motive. By contrast, under footnote four’s
formula, discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority
triggered closer judicial scrutiny. Not only was there not any
preliminary inquiry into the existence of a liberty interest, but
the entire focus of the analysis moved away from the
government’s police power-based reasons for infringing on a
liberty interest and toward to the government’s justifications for
the discrimination itself. In sum, the focus shifts from liberty
interests to anti-discrimination simpliciter.
But this distinction may be more theoretical than real, at
least if due process is to do the work Bernstein thinks it should.
60
Consider Bolling v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown v.
56. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia ordinance mandating
a minimum wage for women).
57. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance prohibiting
real estate sales that would lead to residential integration).
58. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1270–73.
59. See, e.g., Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 80–82 (noting, and rejecting, the city’s racebased reasons for the ordinance); Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53 (noting, and rejecting, the
government’s arguments about women’s incapacity to contract as justifications for the
law); see also Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1272 (“In Buchanan the Court held
that denial of property rights for African Americans could not be based on weak racerelated police power rationales. In Adkins, the Court held that women could not be
denied liberty of contract based solely on weak gender-related police power
rationales.”).
60. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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61

Board of Education, in which the Court struck down school
segregation in District of Columbia schools. As Bernstein has
62
elsewhere argued, Bolling is a confused opinion. The absence
of an Equal Protection Clause binding the federal government
required the Court to rely on the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. While that Clause had long been understood as
63
including some restriction on discrimination, Bolling’s reliance
on due process inevitably raised the specter of resurrecting
Lochner-era jurisprudence, especially given how the Lochnerera Court had combined concepts of liberty and equality.
Bernstein has argued that Bolling would have been a more
coherent opinion had the Court forthrightly relied on the Meyer
line of cases to recognize a liberty to attend a non-segregated
public school, and then, following Lochner-era analysis, had
64
rejected racially discriminatory justifications for the law. But
this approach requires recognizing a liberty interest in attending
a non-segregated public school. That move seems to be a stretch.
As Bernstein himself notes, it is susceptible to the objection that
“once a Lochnerian Court acknowledged that access to a
government-provided service could be construed as a liberty
right, the entire classical/libertarian edifice of Lochner would be
65
lost.” His response—that “a libertarian might argue that to
subsidize one group is the economic equivalent of taxing its
competitors”—and thus that “[t]o subsidize whites’ education
more than blacks’ education . . . is, by economists’ lights, the
66
equivalent of taxing blacks more than whites” seems, at least at
first glance, to erase any boundaries on what we call liberty
rights. If discriminatory access to public education violates the
victim’s liberty, then presumably so does discriminatory access
67
68
to a government contract or broadcasting license, or
69
discriminatory access to any government service at all. If

61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. See generally Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10.
63. See generally id.
64. See, e.g., id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1283 (emphasis in original).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
68. E.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
69. E.g., Kotch v. Bd. of Riverboat Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (government appointment as riverboat pilot); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
(discriminatory access to a city water hookup).
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anything becomes a liberty interest, then searching for a liberty
70
interest becomes a purely formalistic exercise.
The upshot is that if Bernstein is going to argue that the
Bolling Court could have reached the same result via the
standard Lochner-style approach to discriminatory deprivations
of liberty, then presumably most, if not all, modern equal
protection fact patterns can be understood in this way as well.
Perhaps more to the point, if one is willing to expand the notion
of liberty as Bernstein is in his discussion of Bolling, then the
Lochner Court’s own precedents—Meyer, Pierce, Farrington,
Buchanan and Adkins—can be legitimately understood as cases
focusing on the discrimination, not on the liberty interest.
Hence my suggestion that Bernstein is perhaps too harsh in
his evaluation of Carolene Products’s reconceptualization of the
Lochner-era civil rights cases. In addition to the analysis
sketched out above, the rhetoric of those cases rests easily within
a basic concern for equality, separate from the status of the
regulated conduct as a liberty interest. For example, Adkins’
concern for the equal dignity of women fits easily within modern
equal protection doctrine’s aspiration to eradicate stereotypes
about women’s capabilities while recognizing government’s
legitimate authority to compensate women for past discrimin71
ation and account for real differences between the sexes.
Similarly, Justice McReynolds’ refusal in Pierce to allow the
72
government to “standardize” its children can be reasonably
70. It is true enough that there remains a distinction between the Lochner Court’s
second step—considering the police power justifications for the law—and modern equal
protection doctrine’s approach of considering the government interests behind the
challenged classification. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (testing the state’s
gender-based classification against its highway-safety justifications). But this may be a
distinction without a difference. The type of police power argument that government
may have made, say, in Adkins—that women are incapable of contracting as effectively
as men, and thus need the government’s assistance—closely tracks the type of argument
a modern government-defendant would make when defending a classification against an
equal protection challenge. For example, a modern government-defendant defending a
law classifying based on gender might well argue that women are truly different from
men, and merit different treatment. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(accepting this type of argument). Of course, there still has to be some positive
justification for the law, rather than simply a claim that the two groups are similarly
situated. This is simply a restatement of the fundamental rule that every law must have a
justification. But if Bernstein is correct that the Lochner-era Court gave legislatures
broad latitude to legislate for the public good, then the deference with which the modern
Court applies this rule would not differ greatly from how the Lochner Court would apply
the analogous rule that a law must be within the government’s police power.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
72. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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read as reflecting a concern about dissenting or minority
approaches to basic issues such as child-rearing and family
73
structure.
Such a reconceptualization would not make the Pierce line
of cases incoherent or anomalous. For example, approximately
sixty years after Meyer, Justice Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.—another due process case—spoke of the freedom “not to
74
conform.” Tellingly, such freedoms have also been vindicated
75
via the Equal Protection Clause. And approximately sixty years
before Meyer, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed to all
76
individuals the “same rights” to contractual and other liberties,
an equality right whose constitutionalization all agree was at
77
least one of the major goals of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, even during the Lochner era the Court was already
experimenting with this reconceptualization. For example, in
78
79
Nixon v. Herndon, seemingly an equal protection case, the
Court cited Buchanan as an example of invidious race
discrimination, without any mention of the liberty interest
80
Buchanan originally focused on.
73. This concern can work its way through the doctrine either via due process, as
with Pierce and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (considering a challenge to
a California law conclusively presuming paternity to the husband of a woman bearing a
child), or equal protection, as with Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (striking down, as violating equal protection, a law that denied food stamp
benefits to members of unrelated communal homes). See also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing that a city’s denial of a zoning exemption to a group seeking to establish a
group home for mentally retarded persons violated equal protection, but arguing that the
level of scrutiny to be accorded the government action should depend in part on the fact
that the action infringed on the right to establish a residence in a given area). See also
supra note 39.
74. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also text
accompanying supra note 16 (repeating this parallel).
75. See supra note 73.
76. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
77. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 26–27 (2d ed. 1997);
WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104 (1988); TENBROEK, supra note 40 at 224–25.
78. 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down a Texas law authorizing state political parties
to exclude whoever they wished from primary voting, as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment when applied by the state Democratic Party to exclude AfricanAmericans).
79. See id. at 89 (“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special
solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the
court to level by its judgment these barriers of color.”).
80. See id. at 89 (“Delegates of the State’s power have discharged their official
functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 77 [(1917)]. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as
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Thus, it is not self-evident that Justice Stone’s “creative[]
misinterpret[ation]” of the Meyer line of cases was illegitimate,
as suggested by Bernstein’s dismissal of that move. Creative,
yes—even aggressive. Bernstein is right that the Lochner-era
civil rights opinions were doctrinally focused on due process. But
the fact that due process doctrine rejected discrimination as a
legitimate police power objective means that equality considerations would enter into the Court’s analysis, at least in cases that
were ripe for recasting in footnote four as equal protection cases.
This recasting is not necessarily illegitimate, if by 1938 the Court
had come to realize that the Meyer line of cases, the Court’s
then-nascent protection for speech, association and voting rights,
and indeed, the protection of all Bill of Rights provisions it
decided to incorporate, were correct exactly because they presented appropriately-cabined situations where more intrusive
judicial review was called for, while avoiding such review every
81
time government regulated the marketplace.
Bernstein is also correct when he states, immediately after
82
the “intentionally misinterpreted” sentence above, that footnote four “was the Court’s first of several attempts to preserve
[the Meyer] line of cases by disentangling them from their roots
in the now-obsolete liberty of contract line of cases” (p. 104).
But by itself that does not prove that the Court’s action was
illegitimate. It is not unknown for the Court to “disentangle”
holdings it deems correct from an underlying context or
83
foundation it finds problematic. Concededly, such attempts are
potentially problematic, exactly because they provoke the
response that the Court is simply picking the results it wants to
preserve and pruning away the context of surrounding
84
undesirable results in an unprincipled way. But given the

it was with special solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays
a duty upon the court to level by its judgment these barriers of color.” (parallel and
additional citations omitted)).
81. As implied by Carolene Products, such careful review is justified in these
situations because of either the likelihood of a political process breakdown or, in the case
of specific Bill of Rights provisions, the greater legitimacy of judicial enforcement of
specifically-worded constraints on government action. See United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
82. See supra text accompanying note 53.
83. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (arguing that it is
preserving the “central holding” of Roe while correcting other doctrinal mistakes Roe
made).
84. See, e.g., id. at 979, 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (making a similar objection to the joint opinion’s treatment of Roe).
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foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers’ concern
with both liberty and equality, not to mention later justices’
attempts to determine the scope of due process rights by
85
recourse to equality concerns, Stone’s reconceptualization of
these cases deserves at least more study than the quick dismissal
Bernstein provides.
Regardless of one’s views about this question, the point
remains that Lochner did ultimately make footnote four
possible, by paving the way for cases like Meyer and in turn their
eventual reconceptualization as equality cases. This insight raises
a further, more practical question about Lochner and minorities:
how good was Lochner itself for the minorities that its progeny
eventually were understood to protect?
B. LOCHNER AND MINORITIES
Bernstein argues forcefully that Lochner, and the muscular
protection of substantive due process rights it represents, was
good for minorities. As explained above, he draws a clear line
connecting Lochner, the Meyer line of cases and the Court’s
ultimate protection of free expression and criminal procedure
rights. His argument is hard to refute: even if, as suggested above,
the non-economic due process cases can legitimately be reconceptualized as cases about discrimination, the fact remains that
the opinions themselves relied on Lochner and its progeny. In
this way, Bernstein is right to conclude that Lochner eventually
redounded to the significant benefit of minorities.
However, Bernstein pushes the argument further. First, he
argues that economic due process itself helped minorities by
providing a means for courts to strike down discriminatory
government action that impeded the core Lochner right to
contract. In Rehabilitating Lochner, Bernstein presses the point
that Lochner, by leading to the striking down of the Louisville,
Kentucky, residential segregation ordinance in Buchanan v.
86
Warley, provided an important tool for African-Americans to
gain a residential and thus social foothold in major cities.

85. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that due process protects the “freedom not to conform”); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that a holding about the due process right of
gays and lesbians to engage in consensual non-commercial sexual intimacy also furthers
equal protection values).
86. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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This is a provocative claim. To his credit, Bernstein does not
over-argue it. Thus, he writes:
Giving Buchanan its due does not absolve the Supreme Court
of its acquiescence to Jim Crow in other contexts. Nor does it
remotely suggest that the pre-New Deal Court’s civil rights
jurisprudence was superior to that of later Supreme Courts
which, like American society more generally, became
increasingly egalitarian on race. But, given that advocates of
racial equality were a distinct minority among Progressives,
the practical alternative to the early twentieth century’s
liberty of contract jurisprudence was not the Warren Court’s
liberalism but the indifference or hostility to the rights of
African Americans shown by most Progressive legal elites (p.
85).

Still, Bernstein insists that “Buchanan’s implicit protection of
[African-American] migration to urban areas, north and south,
87
proved a crucial turning point in African American history” (p.
83).
This claim seems to me unproven, at least in Rehabilitating
Lochner. Indeed, the structure of the sentence quoted above
suggests that Bernstein himself may not consider the claim fully
proven: the way he writes the sentence, what proved to be “a
crucial turning point in African American history” was the
implicit protection provided by Buchanan. It’s not clear how an
implicit effect can confidently be stated as providing “a crucial
turning point” in history. More generally (if still technically), as a
historical matter the great migration of African-Americans to
88
the north was already under way by 1917. If Buchanan had
come out the other way would that phenomenon have reversed?
Probably not, although it’s certainly plausible that it might have
been mitigated, or that the arriving African-American populations would have found themselves even more socially
isolated than they ended up being.
But a larger problem confronts Bernstein’s claim that
Lochner, via Buchanan, hastened African-Americans’ full
geographic and social integration into American life. This larger
87. See also Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1505–06 (Buchanan “allowed
hundreds of thousands of African Americans to leave impoverished rural plantations for
a better life in cities.”).
88. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51
VAND. L. REV. 881, 897–98 (1998) (“Black migration northwards, which had appreciably
increased in the 1890’s and 1900’s, exploded in 1916 owing to World War I.”); id. at 900.
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problem in turn casts doubt on Lochner’s more general benefits
for minorities. If Buchanan prevented cities from enacting laws
like the Louisville segregation ordinance, then it must also be
recognized that residential segregation continued unabated
throughout the Lochner period. Northern cities were not
suddenly integrated because of Buchanan. If the response to this
observation is that that segregation arose from private choices
rather than government action, the reply is that such private
choices themselves would likely have been constitutionally
protected by the same Lochner doctrine. Indeed, a case of a
white seller refusing to sell to a black buyer in defiance of a nondiscrimination ordinance would feature the mirror image of the
rights claim vindicated in Buchanan. More generally, restrictive
89
covenants, famously struck down in Shelly v. Kraemer and
90
Barrows v. Jackson, featured private party contracts that the
91
Lochner Court presumably would have respected.
Concededly, the key issue in Shelley and Barrows was the
Court’s conclusion that judicial enforcement of the covenant
constituted state action—not, at least technically, a rejection of
property owners’ claims that they had the right to contract to
92
dispose of their property as they wished. Nevertheless, it is hard
to believe that the Lochner Court, so committed to respecting a
sphere of private freedom of action, would have adopted the
same state action analysis as that of the very different,
Roosevelt-dominated, Court in Shelley and Barrows. Indeed,
Plessy v. Ferguson’s stubborn insistence that any badge of
inferiority connoted by the Louisiana train segregation statute

89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
91. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (suggesting the meritlessness
of a claim that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant by a District of
Columbia court violated the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment); see also Klarman, supra.
note 88, at 942 n.336 (noting state court decisions holding that such judicial enforcement
did not constitute state action).
92. Of course, the Court’s broad understanding of state action in Shelley had the
potential effect of converting private contractual decisions into state action. In this sense,
Shelley’s state action analysis effectively restricted private parties’ contractual freedom
by rendering that freedom subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, at
least to the extent a contracting party sought a court’s aid in vindicating the terms of the
contract.
Commentators have noted the potentially broad effect of Shelley’s analysis on
private parties’ freedom to contract as they wish. See, e.g., ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER
MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 20–21 (5th ed. 2010); Martin Dolan,
Comment, State Inaction and Section 1985(3): United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. Scott, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1280–81 (1986).
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flowed from African-Americans’ own perceptions, and not the
93
state itself, suggests that the Lochner-era Court was not
94
committed to a broad conception of state action. Thus,
instances of private discrimination with regard to real estate
transactions not only continued to exist after Buchanan, but
presumably enjoyed constitutional protection based on the same
freedom of contract doctrine that underlay Buchanan itself.
If this analysis is correct, it follows that legislative action
attacking such private discriminatory choices—not just in real
estate, but more generally throughout the economy—would also
be suspect under Lochner-style reasoning. In particular,
employment non-discrimination and other similar laws likely
would have been attacked during this era as inconsistent with
Lochner’s presumptive protection for the rights of individuals to
95
decide with whom they wished to deal. If a law prohibiting
employers from demanding that would-be employees not join a
union unconstitutionally violated both groups’ freedom of
96
contract, then presumably a law requiring employers, shop-

93. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (“We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.”).
94. It is true that the Court was willing to find state action in legislation that authorized political party action. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down, as
state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a Texas law authorizing state political
committees to set their own membership qualifications, as implemented by the state
Democratic Party in a racially discriminatory way); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (invalidating a predecessor statute to the one struck down in Condon, which
explicitly barred African-Americans from participating in a Democratic Party primary,
but not discussing the state action issue). The Herndon statute’s explicit government
discrimination makes it understandable why the state action issue was not explicitly
discussed. It is worth noting that where that issue mattered, in Condon, the Four
Horsemen dissented. See Condon, 286 U.S. at 90 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
95. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373,
384 (2003) (“Anti-discrimination laws did not exist during the Lochner era but would
certainly be challenged as abridgments of freedom of contract today if Lochner
survived.”); Klarman, supra note 88, at 939 n.323 (“The same substantive due process
notions that invalidate residential segregation ordinances can be invoked to invalidate
civil rights statutes on the ground that the state should not interfere with the contractual
freedom of employers or owners of places of public accommodation.”). With regard to
places of public accommodation it is at least possible that their common law foundation
might save their constitutionality, to the extent that foundation implied a legitimate
police power justification for them. See generally Joseph Singer, No Right To Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
96. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down state law prohibiting
discharge of an employee for joining a union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (striking down similar federal law).
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keepers and real property owners not to discriminate would be
similarly vulnerable, even in light of the fact that the Lochner
Court upheld much social and economic regulation. It was only
when the right to contract fell from favor that the due process
argument against such laws became, if not frivolous, then at least
97
a likely loser.
Second, as a practical matter it’s not clear what effect
Lochner had on minorities. In Rehabilitating Lochner Bernstein
cites only a state court case from Georgia, invalidating a law
prohibiting black barbers from cutting white children’s hair, as
an example of “liberty of contract reasoning” that was used in a
98
way to further the interests of African-Americans (p. 85). To
his credit, Bernstein recognizes that civil rights lawyers of the era
did not have the resources to litigate such claims aggressively.
He also suggests that groups such as the NAACP were not
inclined to rely on liberty of contract reasoning, since “by the
1920’s the NAACP’s leadership had an economically
‘Progressive’ outlook, and was therefore hesitant to rely on
‘conservative’ constitutional doctrines like liberty of contract”
(p. 85).
These observations betray more ambiguities with
Bernstein’s thesis that, for minorities, the liberty of contract was,
99
if not perfect, at least the best thing they had going. Most
notably, if the lack of resources meant that civil rights groups
were not able to enforce African-Americans’ contractual liberty
rights then one can at least argue that a better strategy would
have been for them to enlist the aid of government, via antidiscrimination statutes. Of course, Bernstein is correct in his
implicit suggestion that aggressive non-discrimination legislation
100
was not forthcoming in the 1920’s. In that sense, there’s merit
97. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59 (1964)
(rejecting a due process challenge to the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by applying a very deferential rational basis standard); id. at 275, 277
(Black, J., concurring) (“In the past this Court has consistently held that regulation of the
use of property by the Federal Government or the States does not violate either the Fifth
or the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
98. Bernstein does cite one other case, dealing with ethnic Chinese merchants in
the Philippines, where liberty of contract reasoning was used to assist an ethnic minority.
(p. 85 n.93, citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 50 (1926) (invalidating a Philippines
law requiring that business records be kept either in English or Spanish)).
99. Bernstein has developed this thesis in more detail elsewhere. See BERNSTEIN,
ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21.
100. On the other hand, by the 1920’s some states had enacted public accommodations laws. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 95, at 1374 (noting that states started
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in his claim that Lochner might have been the best tool
minorities had. But again, to the extent that such legislation
would have been threatened by exactly that same liberty of
contract doctrine, it may be the case that had Lochner survived
into the civil rights era it would have impeded African101
Americans’ civil rights legislative agenda.
This insight perhaps suggests why the NAACP leadership
“was . . . hesitant to rely on ‘conservative’ constitutional doc102
trines like liberty of contract” (p. 85). Alternatively, perhaps
that hesitancy was based more on the needs of a tactical alliance
with anti-Lochner northern Progressives. But if this latter
speculate is accurate, it starts to blur the clarity of Bernstein’s
103
picture of a Progressive movement largely hostile to minorities.
In sum, either the NAACP leadership concluded that liberty of
contract would ultimately redound to African-Americans’
detriment, or they calculated that an alliance with northern, antiLochner, Progressives was more important than any marginal
advantage they could win by relying on Lochner. Either
possibility creates at least some tension with Bernstein’s overall
narrative.
These arguments by no means completely refute Bernstein’s
claim that, given the available options, Lochner was the
strongest tool minorities (and particularly African-Americans)
possessed. Still, the vulnerability of anti-discrimination legislation to liberty of contract reasoning makes it plausible to
conclude that equality advocates were ultimately correct to
downplay reliance on Lochner. At the very least, the fact that
the NAACP leadership—hardly unsophisticated advocates—
disdained that reasoning suggests that there must have been a
good reason for them to believe that Lochner was not the right
path to take. Indeed, the fact that Carolene Products ultimately
enacting such laws in the immediate post-Civil War period).
101. In other writing Bernstein appears to agree with this assessment. See
BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21, at 113–14.
102. Similarly, at least some women’s rights groups during this era favored protective
legislation for all workers, a position inconsistent with support for an extension of
Lochner’s contractual liberty right to women. See, e.g., JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING
WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 187, 198 (2001) (cited in Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10,
at 1975).
103. In a footnote Bernstein does acknowledge that some pro-civil rights
Progressives favored unions despite the latters’ racism, on the theory that unionization
represented the best long-term hope for African-Americans’ economic prospects (p. 52
n.108).
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provided a formula for protecting African-Americans’ equality
rights while simultaneously preserving government’s latitude to
enact anti-discrimination laws that regulated marketplace
choices ultimately confirms the correctness of their choice to
reject Lochner.
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The above critiques notwithstanding, there is much merit in
Bernstein’s suggestion that Lochner is the ultimate precursor to
the modern substantive due process privacy cases. Indeed,
Lochner, by opening the way for the Meyer line of cases, the
cases protecting free speech, and the cases incorporating the
criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights, can be
understood as (very) indirectly paving the way for footnote
four’s reconceptualization of these cases as, respectively, cases
protecting minorities, protecting the political process, and
recognizing the legitimacy of judicial protection of textuallybased constitutional rights.
The progression from robust judicial protection of
unenumerated rights to a more nuanced recognition that some
groups require special judicial protection from the legislative
free-for-all is being replayed in the modern era. The modern
privacy cases—most notably the abortion cases and Lawrence v.
104
Texas —have been subject to criticism that has never really
abated since Roe. That criticism has led commentators
sympathetic to those cases’ results to argue for a recasting of
those rights as sounding in equality. This phenomenon has been
most pronounced in the abortion context: ever since Roe,
commentators sympathetic to the abortion right have argued
that that right was better understood as flowing from the
105
Constitution’s commitment to women’s equality. In the context
of sexuality, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence argued
that the Texas law banning same-sex sodomy was more

104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Most notably, before ascending to the Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued forcefully for understanding the abortion right as a right based in women’s
equality. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). She has continued to express this
view on the Court, albeit within the limits of the current doctrine’s housing of the
abortion right in substantive due process. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
168, 184–85 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using equality language to describe the
importance of the abortion right).
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appropriately struck down as a violation of equal protection,
rather than as a violation of the majority’s loosely-defined right
to private, consensual, non-commercial sexual conduct between
106
adults. The current fight over same-sex marriage rights is
replaying this debate, with some courts and commentators
sympathetic to the rights claim arguing that it should inhere in
equality guarantees rather than in an alleged “fundamental right
107
to marriage.”
Thus, just as in the Lochner era, a substantive right
recognized by courts has come under attack, and has generated
calls, not for reversing the results of all the cases decided under
that doctrine, but instead for their reconceptualization as
equality cases. The same arguments made in favor of this change
in the 1930’s are heard today. It is argued that judicial
recognition of substantive rights is subjective, lacks a legitimate
grounding in judicial competence, and amounts to judicial
108
policymaking. On the other side of the ledger, advocates for an
equality approach claimed during the Lochner era and claim
today that such an approach respects legislative value choices
and simply requires the legislature to provide to the disfavored
109
group what it provides for the favored group.

106. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. E.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); See also, e.g., Nelson
Tebbe & Debra Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375
(2010) (arguing that the best doctrinal vehicle for same-sex marriage rights is the fundamental rights strand of equal protection).
108. But see Carlos Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review is as Legitimate as Equality
Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2011) (arguing
that equal protection review is no more cabined or objective than due process review);
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (describing a
new, dignity-based, approach to rights protection).
109. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111, 112–13
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few
to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might
be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.”); Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292, 300 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Are there,
then, no reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an
individual to preserve his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth in the
Due Process Clause. What assures us that those limits will not be exceeded is the same
constitutional guarantee that is the source of most of our protection—what protects us,
for example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income above the subsistence
level, from being forbidden to drive cars, or from being required to send our children to
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It remains to be seen how such calls for an equality
approach will be resolved. We are a long way from 1938, when
the Court could confidently presume that it had the competence
to determine when “prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities” really existed, and thus justified more searching
110
judicial review. But the larger point remains: what Lochner
teaches us is that a judicial doctrine can generate progeny that
morph into new doctrines, once the results under the original
doctrine are better understood with the passage of time.
At least this is one way a student could answer the opening
111
question.

school for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles are categorically prohibited by the
Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on
you and me.”).
110. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis
Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TULANE L. REV. 519, 521–23 (2005) (noting the Court’s
inconsistent and unsteady application of footnote four’s formula); see also Bruce
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (critiquing the
usefulness of footnote fours’s “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”
formula).
111. See text accompanying supra notes 3–4.

